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RELIGION, EDUCATION
AND THE LAW
JAmES E. HARPSTER*
In times past men have argued religious doctrine and religious
dogma with great heat, and occasionally with great light. The history
of the world is replete with debates on theological themes. Some of
them have been momentous, many of them have been merely trite.
In pagan days the subject matter concerned the existence or the non-
existence of the gods. Shortly after the beginning of the Christian era
the debates no longer concerned themselves with the question of whether
God exists-that was taken for granted-but with questions of His
essence, His Commandments, and the like. Today religion is still an
extremely controversial subject. But we seem no longer to be interested
in doctrinal accuracy. Our society is more interested in the externals of
religious practice.
On one side of the present conflict are those who still believe that
the worship of God constitutes the most important single element in
man's existence. They therefore hold for the religious education of
the nation's youth so that they may grow with a knowledge of God and
their duty to Him. On the other side stand two groups. First are the
atheists and the freethinkers who would banish God completely from
our midst. The other group is made up of those persons who fear that
religious education will weaken constitutional guarantees of liberty.
Today God's side is losing.
A most powerful weapon is being leveled at religious education.
It is the rather nebulous concept of separation of Church and State. By
virtue of the interpretation placed on the first Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, by the proponents of atheism, in-
differentism, and secularism, the State is absolutely forbidden to assist
in any manner in the religious education of America's children. This of
course makes such education difficult, and at times impossible. The
arguments advanced and the interpretations put forward have often been
extreme to the point of absurdity. Yet the courts of the nation, including
the Supreme Court of the United States, have accepted, at least in part,
much of what has been presented to them. Religious education has re-
ceived many severe set-backs by reason of judicial decision, all based on
the principle of the separation of Church and State. It is the opinion of
this writer that certain of the opinions handed down by the courts will
result, not in the separation of Church and State, but in the disintegra-
tion of both.
* LL.B., Marquette University; Member of the Wisconsin Bar; Board Member,
MARQUErrE LAw REviEW, 1951-52.
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Now there can be no doubt that, properly understood, the First
Amendment does provide for the separation of the Church from the
State and the State from the Church. Nor can there be any doubt of
the wisdom of the provision when properly applied. It is the mis-
application of the principle which is mischievous, which is so deleterious
to the health of both societies. In this article we will attempt four
things: first, to briefly review the law applied by the courts to the
various phases of the field of religious education; second, to restate the
moral responsibility of the State to safeguard the religious welfare of
the nation from harmful influences; third, to interpret the First Amend-
ment as it applies to religion in education; and last, to point out the
harm which has and must ensue from stretching the meaning of the
First Amendment beyond its manifest intent.
THE LAW
Any decision of the courts on the question of what the federal or
-state governments may do where religious interests conflict in the field
of education depends upon an interpretation of the First Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States and the several state constitu-
tions. In its applicable portion the First Amendment provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. .. ." In recent years this prohibi-
tion on Congress has been extended to state action by judicial interpre-
tation of the Fourteenth Amendment.' This latter Amendment provides
that,
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. ' 2
In addition to these Amendments to the Federal Constitution, the
constitutions of all of the forty-eight states have provisions relating to
the Church-State relationship. 3 While these provisions are variously
phrased, and while slight differences in their application to specified sets
of facts do appear, yet they are for the most part of an even tenor and
equal intent. The Wisconsin Constitution may be taken as fairly repre-
sentative 6f the group, although, as we shall later see, it is interpreted
more strictly than most. The three pertinept sections of this Constitu-
tion are as follows:
"The right of every man to worship Almighty God according
IMeyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042, 29 A.L.R. 1446
(1923); Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, 293 U.S. 245,
55 S.Ct. 197, 79 L.Ed. 343 (1934); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940).
2 U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
3 11 Am. Jun. 1101, CONSTrruTIoNAL LAW § 312.
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to the dictates of his own conscience shall never be infringed;
nor shall any man be compelled to attend, erect or support any
place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, against his consent;
nor shall any control of, or interference with, the rights of
conscience be permitted, or any preference be given by law to any
religious establishments or modes of worship; nor shall any
money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of religious
societies, or religious or theological seminaries. 14
"The legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of
district schools, . . . and no sectarian instruction shall be allowed
therein."'
"Provision shall be made by law for the establishment of a
state university at or near the seat of state government, . . . and
no sectarian instruction shall be allowed in such university."6
From time to time various customs, practices, regulations, ordi-
nances, and statutes have been called into question in the state and
federal courts involving questions of whether the education of children
has been so handled as to violate the religious principles enunciated in
the respective constitutions. The issues thus presented have been
various, as have the decisions handed down on any particular issue.
Although there is some uniformity in the decisions along certain lines,
yet it is not incorrect to say that the law has no settled pattern. What
was permissible yesterday is not necessarily so today. And what is
permissible in one state is not necessarily so in another. As we shall
point out later, there is a secularistic influence creeping into the law
which is extending the interpretation of constitutional provisions far
beyond their stated intent. On the other hand,. the law of physics which
states that to every action there is an opposite and equal reaction, has
manifested itself in the courts. The extremely unpopular decision in
the McCollum case 7 has initiated a careful investigation of the law by
the legal profession in order to prevent the total exclusion of God from
our society. For disappear He will if the education of the nation's
children is forever barren of Him.
We have in this article selected ten topics on which we wish to
restate the law. These topics are not exhaustive of the subject matter,
but they are at least fairly representative. They range from the right
of parents to direct the education of their children to released time
programs, from the use of public property by religious societies to the
wearing of religious garb in public schools. Our plan of attack shall be
to present the issue, to summarize a few of the arguments for and
4 WIS. CONST. ART. I, § 18.
5 Wis. CONST. ART. X, § 3.
6 WIS. CONST. ART. X, § 6.
7 People of the State of Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education of
School District. No. 71, Champaign County, Illinois, 333 U.S. 203, 68 S.Ct.
461, 92 L.Ed. 649, 2 A.L.R. 2d 1338 (1948); noted 32 MARQ. L. REv. 138
(1948).
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against the proposition, to briefly review the law today, and to present
our criticism, if any, on legal and moral grounds.
I
THE ISSUE:
Does the State have the sole right to control the education of
children?
FOR THE AFFIRMATIVE:
It is the duty of the State to protect the welfare of its citizens. In
order to afford such protection the State must control whatever pertains
to the common good. The education of children most particularly per-
tains to the common good, since teachings which are inimical to the
public welfare subject the community to dangers of upheaval. To be
effective this state control must be exclusive. Therefore, the State
alone has the right to control the education of children.
FOR THE NEGATIVE:
The child is not a mere creature of the State. The fundamental
theory of democratic government is that the State exists for the benefit
of the people, and not that the people exist for the benefit of the State.
Admittedly the State has the right to prevent teachings which are
inimical to the public welfare, but this is a different thing from saying
that the State has the sole right to educate. The education of children
is intimately connected with the well-being of the State, and, therefore,
the State may require, and indeed has the duty to require, the education
of all minors, but this is a different thing from saying that the State has
the sole right to educate. Since consideration for the good of the com-
munity demands that certain subjects be taught to children for the
advancement of good moral and patriotic character, the State may
prescribe that these subjects be taught, but, again, this is a different
thing from saying that the State has the sole right to educate.
The right of education lies, rather, with the parents of the child.
They are responsible for his existence, and they are therefore likewise
responsible for his care. They must feed him, they must clothe him,
and they must educate him. Having brought the child, helpless, into the
world, the parents must relieve this state of helplessness. Since they
have the duty, they have the right. Further, they alone have the degree
of love and understanding of their particular child to direct his educa-
tion. Therefore, the right to educate resides in the parents alone.
Since the parent has the right to educate, he has the concomitant
right to entrust the child's education into the hands of others whom he
designates. He may entrust his child to a public or state school, or he
may entrust him to a private school, either religious or secular. In order
that the parent may exercise this latter right, there must exist such
private schools. Private schools, then, have a right of existence for the
1952]
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purpose of educating the children entrusted to them. And since private
schools have a right to educate, this right necessarily does not belong
exclusively to the State.
THE LAW:
In 1922, the people of Oregon, by referendum, adopted the Oregon
Compulsory Education Act." This law, which was to become effective
on September 1, 1926, provided that every person in the state having
charge of a child between the ages of eight and sixteen years was
obliged to send that child to a public school, or be guilty of a mis-
demeanor, exceptions being made for children who were subnormal,
who had passed the eighth grade, or who lived too far distant from a
public school to attend. Two private schools, one conducted by the
Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, a Roman
Catholic religious community, and one being the Hill Military Academy,
both Oregon corporations, sought and obtained injunctions in the United
States District Court for Oregon against the Governor of Oregon and
other Oregon officials who were threatening to enforce this law.9 The
defendants appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. In an
opinion by Mr. Justice McReynolds the Court affirmed the decree
granting the injunctions.10 After remarking that the private schools
were engaged in an undertaking that was useful and meritorious, rather
than harmful, and that there was nothing to indicate that the schools had
failed to discharge their obligations to the State, their patrons, or their
students, and that there was no indication of a present emergency rela-
tive to education which would justify the use of extraordinary measures,
the opinion went on to say:
"Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042, 29 A.L.R. 1446, we think it entirely
plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control. As often heretofore
pointed out, rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be
abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to
some purpose within the competency of the State. The funda-
mental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this
Union repose excludes any general power of the State to stan-
dardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from
public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the
State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
him for additional obligations.""
8 ORE. LAWS (1923) § 5259.
9 Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary v. Pierce, 296
Fed. 928 (D.C.Ore. 1924).
10 Pierce et al. v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary,
268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070, 39 A.L.R. 468 (1925).
"Ibid., at p. 534. The same doctrine was stated by the Colorado court in People
ex rel. VolImar v. Stanley et al., 81 Colo. 276, 255 Pac. 610 (1927).
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The Court recognized, however, -the right of the State to reasonably
regulate all schools, private as well as public; to inspect, supervise, and
examine them, their teachers, and their students; to require attendance
at some school for all children; to require that teachers have the
proper moral and patriotic qualifications ;72 to compel the teaching of
certain subjects which are plainly essential to good citizenship; and,
finally, to prohibit the teaching of anything which is adverse to the
public welfare.1 3
By this decision the Supreme Court gave positive law confirmation
of a natural law right, viz., the right of parents to direct the education
of their children. The private and parochial school derives its right from
'this inherent right of the parent. The correctness of the Oregon case
is not open to dispute.
II
THE ISSUE:
Are antenuptial agreements relating to the religious education of
probable children of the union capable of enforcement in the courts of
the State?
FOR THE AFFIRMATIVE:
Since a parent has a right to direct the education of his children, he
may make a contract relating to this education. And since this right of
education resides in both parents equally, and since they may have
divergent views, they may contract with each other to let the educa-
tional policies of one determine the child's future. If the parents are
thus capable of contracting concerning the subject matter, the agree-
ment into which they enter is a valid contract. As a valid contract, it is
capable of specific enforcement under the same rules governing the
issuance of a decree ordering specific performance for other contracts.
The antenuptial agreement fulfills the conditions laid down for other
contracts.
FOR THE NEGATIVE:
A court of equity does not have the power to decree the specific
performance of a moral duty. Because the State cannot prefer one
religion over another, it cannot compel a parent to educate a child in a
12 This right has just recently been reiterated in Adler et al. v. Board of Educa-
tion of City of New York, 72 S.Ct. Rep. 380 (1952), in which the Supreme
Court upheld the validity of § 12-a of the New York Civil Service Law(N.Y. Laws 1939, c. 547, as amended N.Y. Laws 1940, c. 564) as implemented
by the so-called Feinberg Law (N.Y. Laws 1949, c. 360). This statute pro-
vided that any member of an organization listed by the Board of Regents
as subversive would be ineligible for employment as a teacher in the public
schools.
13 However, in Meyer v. Nebraska, supra, note 1, referred to by Mr. Justice
McReynolds, the Court held that the State may not forbid the teaching of
foreign languages in private schools, such a requirement exceeding the bounds
of reasonable regulation, and encroaching on the parental right to direct the
education of the child.
1952]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
specific religion. The right of the parent to educate devolves on him for
the benefit of the child, not for his own benefic, and, hence, he can
neither irretrievably waive the right nor irrevocably contract it away.
Finally, such a decree is extremely difficult to enforce, making its
issuance a nullity in many cases, a situation into which courts of equity
take care not to fall.
THE LAW:
The cases concerning the religious education of children as defined
in antenuptial agreements generally do not arise between the original
parties. Rather the controversies generally arise between one parent
and the parent of his deceased spouse, or between maternal and paternal
relatives of deceased parents who enjoy divergent religious views. For
the most part the courts will refuse to grant a decree enforcing such
antenuptial agreements, on one or more of the grounds stated in the
arguments for the negative given above. At least one court has stated
that, where the controversy is between the original parent-parties to the
contract, the agreement will estop the challenging parent from exer-
cising his prerogative to educate.1 4 This assertion of the court was mere
dicta, however, inasmuch as the case before the court was between the
respective relatives of both deceased parents. A Pennsylvania case 15
found that the material welfare of the child was its primary concern,
and was able to pass over the question of the validity of the ante-
nuptial agreement when the children's paternal grandfather (opposed
in the custody suit by their maternal grand-aunt), who was not of the
religious preference designated in the agreement, agreed to raise the
children in their mother's faith until they were old enough to choose for
themselves. The grandfather was made the children's guardian.
Pennsylvania had a statute which provided that in the appoint-
ment of guardians, persons of the same religion as the parents of the
child were preferable. The court apparently felt that the grandfather's
promise was equivalent to this preference. This seems doubtful, how-
ever, since the grandfather probably had little sympathy for such
education, and was certainly incompetent to impart it himself. The
influence of the household will most often outweigh formal instruction
given in parochial or Sunday schools.
There are many persuasive arguments on each side of this issue.
On the whole the American courts have decided against the enforcement
of contracts which determine the religious education of children. The
wisdom of such decisions is questionable, however, in view of the fact
that the parties themselves consider the contract so important that in
1In re Luck, 10 Ohio Sup. & C.P. Dec. 1 (1899).
'5 In re Butcher's Estate, 266 Pa. 479, 109 At. 683 (1920).
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many cases, notably those in which one of the parties is Catholic, the
marriage would never have been celebrated without it.
III
THE ISSUE:
May students of private sectarian educational institutions be com-
pelled by the regulations of such institutions to take part in religious and
other exercises when such exercises are in opposition to their own
particular faith?
FOR THE AFFIRMATIVE:
Private sectarian schools and colleges are set up and supported by
members of religious congregations for the purpose of inculcating in
their children the religious doctrines and principles in which they
believe. Such schools and colleges, being private, are under no obliga-
tion to take in students belonging to some faith other than their own.
Since they need not take in such students, any admission of them is an
act of hospitality. The schools may condition the extension of their
hospitality on an acceptance of their rules and regulations by the
student. The student's only alternative to a compliance with these rules
is withdrawal from the school. Should the student accept neither alter-
native the school may withdraw its hospitality and drop him from its
roster.
FOR THE NEGATIVE:
Stdidents must often attend a sectarian school in order to receive an
education. By threatening to withdraw this education from the student,
the school is applying economic or other sanctions to compel him to
attend a religious exercise against the dictates of his own conscience.
Compulsory attendance at a religious worship is a violation of the
student's constitutional rights. It is immaterial whether the coercion is
applied by the State or by an individual, it constitutes a denial of
religious freedom under either circumstance.
THE LAW:
The cases on this particular issue are not numerous. The question
can only arise where a student seeks to take advantage of certain oppor-
tunities which are open to him only at a sectarian school, either because
of the availability of certain courses or instructors, or because of his
individual economic circumstances, and yet at the same time wishes to
avoid those obligations which the school imposes on all of its students.
The average student accepts the, to him, disagreeable features of the
school in order to obtain those benefits that he most particularly wants
from it. He does not usually jeopardize these benefits by a court action.
This accounts for the scarcity of cases on the question.
When a student matriculates in a private school it is commonly
understood that he, or his parent, is entering into a contract with that
1952]
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school. Implicit in that contract is the student's stipulation that he will
abide by the regulations of the school.' 6 Dismissal will result from a
breach of this stipulation.17 The City Court of Buffalo, New York,
found against the school, however, when this issue was presented. The
school, a military academy, had a regulation which required Sunday
attendance at various Christian churches in a local village. A Jewish
student refused to attend a Presbyterian church because its teachings
were in opposition to his own religious convictions. There was no
church of this student's faith in the village. The academy offered to let
him attend his own church some fourteen miles away at his own expense.
This offer was declined, and the student was consequently expelled. The
school then brought an action to recover the full amount of the tuition
for the school term during which the expulsion took place. The contract
between the school and the parents provided for such payment. The
court denied recovery, holding that compulsory church attendance was
not part of the school's curriculum as provided by the contract. The
court found that the statement in the catalogue referring to church
attendance was inconspicuous, and the regulation was not contained in
a list of regulations contained elsewhere in the catalogue. The court
went on to say that even if this requirement were considered a part of
the contract, it would be invalid as applied to a non-Christian student."
It is significant that this decision was reached in a case where the student
was no longer in attendance at the school. There is nothing in the case
to suggest that a school must keep on its roster a student who will not
abide by its regulations.
Although the decisions on private school regulations involving the
practice of religion are rare, there are several cases in which the pre-
scriptions of public institutions of higher learning have, or were alleged
to have, violated religious convictions. At least two cases have upheld
the right of state universities to prescribe courses in military training
for all students, notwithstanding that such training might be in violation
of the religious beliefs of some of the students.'9 In Hamilton v.
Regents the parents of two students brought into question the validity of
an order of the Regents of the University of California requiring every
able-bodied male student to take a course in military science. The
petitioners contended that the order was a deprivation of liberty without
due process of law in violation of the guarantee of the Fourteenth
16 Teeter v. Homer Military School, 165 N.C. 564, 81 S.E. 767, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.)
975, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 309 (1914).
"7 "It is well established by a long line of decisions in practically all of the
states in the Union that a private school has power to adopt rules for the
regulation of its pupils, and to dismiss pupils who violate them." Hoadley
v. Allen, 108 Cal. App. 468, 291 Pac. 601, 602 (1930).
18 Miami Military Institute v. Leff, 129 Misc. 481, 220 N.Y.S. 799 (1926).
19 Hamilton v. Regents, supra, note 1; Pearson et al. v. Coale et al., 165 Md.
224, 167 Atl. 54 (1933).
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Amendment of the Federal Constitution. The Supreme Court of the
United States upheld the order of the Regents. The Court said:
"There need be no attempt to enumerate or comprehensively
to define what is included in the 'liberty' protected by the due
process clause. Undoubtedly it does include the right to entertain
the beliefs, to adhere to the principles and to teach the doctrines
on which these students base their objections to the order pre-
scribing military training. (Cases cited.) The fact that they
are able to pay their way in this university but not in any other
institution in California is without significance upon any constitu-
tional or other question here involved. California has not drafted
or called them to attend the university. They are seeking educa-
tion offered by the State and at the same time insisting that they
be excluded from the prescribed course solely upon grounds of
their religious beliefs and conscientious objections to war, prep-
aration for war and military education. Taken on the basis of the
facts alleged in the petition, appellants' contentions amount to no
more than as assertion that the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment as a safeguard of 'liberty' confers the right to
be students in the state university free from obligation to take
military training as one of the conditions of attendance.
"Viewed in the light of our decisions that proposition must at
once be put aside as untenable."
20
An even more decided case involved a regulation passed by the
Trustees of the University of Illinois which required all students to
attend non-sectarian religious services in the university chapel.21 This
provision was attacked as being violative of the Constitution of Illinois
which prohibited compulsory attendance at a place of worship. The
Illinois court held that compulsory attendance at chapel was not com-
pulsory attendance at a place of worship, and the regulation was
upheld.22
IV
THE ISSUE:
Is the exemption of sectarian school property from taxation an
unlawful state aid to religion?
FOR THE AFFIRMATIVE:
The constitutions of all states provide in some manner that no person
shall be compelled to support any church. The guarantee of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments re-enforce these state constitutional pro-
visions. If the State exempts church or sectarian school property from
2 0 Hamilton v. Regents, supra, note 1, at p. 262.
21 North v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois, 137 Ill. 296, 27 N.E.
54 (1891).
- The decision in these cases would probably have been different had attendance
at the universit'es been compulsory under state compulsory education laws.
However, see Topic VII, p. 42, infra, for a discussion of those considerations
which might permit the same result even if attendance at the universities
were compulsory.
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taxation, it is helping to further the beliefs of those particular sects.
Further, such exemptions proportionately increase the taxes which the
remaining property holders must pay. This has the effect of compelling
every taxpayer to support any religion so favored and to help propagate
its tenets. Such compulsion is a violation of his constitutional rights.
FOR THE NEGATIVE:
While undoubtedly the exemption of sectarian school property from
taxation constitutes an aid to religion, such aid is not unlawful. Thirty-
two state constitutions specifically allow such exemptions, fifteen of
them making it mandatory. In the remaining sixteen constitutions there
is an implied power vested in the legislature to exempt property from
taxation. The right to tax carries with it the concomitant right not to
tax. Further, one provision of a constitution (that prohibiting involun-
tary support of religious societies) cannot be interpreted in such a way
that a more express provision (that exempting or allowing an exemp-
tion of property devoted to religious uses) will be nullified.
Nor can it be argued that the tax exemption of religious property
results in an involuntary contribution to the religious societies holding
such property. Nothing is given to these groups; it is just that nothing
is taken from them. That the tax rate of other taxpayers is thereby
increased does not seem to be material, since their money goes, not to,
religion, but to those public uses which the State maintains through the
use of public moneys.
Nor is it unlawful for the State to discriminate in its taxation of
property, providing there is a reasonable basis for the State's classifica-
tion into taxable and non-taxable property.2 3 The classification which
exempts school property, even though sectarian, is reasonable, since such
schools are dedicated to the public use.
THE LAW:
Church and school property have been held tax exempt since early
in our history. Such exemptions were in effect long before they were
codified into constitutional or statutory provisions. At one time the
Church was considered an agency of the State, and necessarily tax
exempt since the State would not tax itself. As this idea disappeared,
the exemption was based on the benefit which the public received from
religious worship and education. The notion soon gained ground in the
courts, however, that only such property was tax exempt that was
specifically exempted by provision of law. As a consequence of this
doctrine, all states have provided for such exemption either in their
constitution or by statute. The exemption extends to all sects and
23 "There is nothir-g in the Fourteenth Amendment that requires land and stock
to be taxed at the same rate or by the same tests. ... Klein v. Board of
Tax Supervisors of Jefferson County, Kentucky, 282 U.S. 19, 24, 51 S.Ct. 15,
16, 75 L.Ed. 140, 143, 73 A.L.R. 679, 682 (1930).
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religious groups, and there is, therefore, no question of state preference
of one religion over another.-
In Iowa, as in Wisconsin, there is no constitutional provision either
demanding or allowing tax exemptions for churches or religious schools.
Iowa passed an exemption statute, and, in 1877, an action was brought
to have the statute declared unconstitutional as violative of the provision
forbidding the compelling of any person to pay taxes for the construc-
tion or maintenance of any church or other place of worship. The court
upheld the statute, however, on the ground that the prohibition in the
Iowa Constitution referred only, to the levying of taxes for Church
purposes, and not to an exemption of property taxes for churches.2 5
Most courts require that a sectarian school be devoted to the public
in order for it to come within the exemption.26 Thus, a religious acad-
emy for girls was held not exempt where the school charged $1,000 a
year in tuition, since only a limited number of people could attend under
these conditions. It was not an institution "sequestered from private use
and dedicated to public use." 27 Any institution which has for its purpose
the making of a profit does not come within the exemption, whether or
not such profit is ever made.28 However, the mere fact that a school
charges tuition and makes a profit thereby will not prevent its property
from being tax exempt if the profit is again turned back into the
school.29
The exemption of religious property has long enjoyed widespread
public support, and rightly so, for, whether it is held that the State may
aid religion or not, it is clearly immoral for the State to impose burdens
upon it.1
'2o
V
THE ISSUE:
Is the use of religious property as a public school a violation of the
Federal or state constitutions?
FOR THE AFFIRMATIVE:
By using religious property for public school purposes, the State is
aiding a particular religious organization in two ways, both unconstitu-
24"The circumstances that Bible teaching and religious instruction are made a
prominent feature in the course of study does not make the academy any
less an educational institution; nor does the fact that it is a denominational
school prevent a finding that it is exempt from taxation under the statute."
South Lancaster Academy v. Inhabitants of Town of Lancaster, 242 Mass.
553, 558, 136 N.E. 626, 629 (1922).
25 Trustees of Griswold College v. State, 46 Iowa 275 (1877).
2661 C.J., TAXATION §§ 527, 530.
27 Female Academy of the Sacred Heart of Albany v. Town of Darien, 108
Conn. 136, 142 Atl. 678 (1928).
28 Mayor and Council of Wilmington v. Wilmington Monthly Meeting of
Friends, West Street, 3 Harr. (33 Del.) 180, 133 Atl. 88 (1926).
29 Congregational Sunday School and Publishing Society v. Board of Review,
290 Il1. 108, 125 N.E. 7 (1919).30 Pope Leo XIII, Encyclical, I-nnortale Dei, 1885.
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tional: by paying state money as rental to a religious society, the State
is aiding this society with public moneys, and this is equivalent to an
involuntary contribution by the taxpayer to a church group; and by
compelling minors under the state compulsory education laws to attend
school in a church-owned school building, the State is exposing the
children to religious doctrines and influences opposed to their own faith.
FOR THE NEGATIVE:
The State is not obliged to buy and own land and buildings in order
to maintain its offices or its schools. There is no constitutional or
statutory prohibition on the State preventing it from renting the build-
ings it needs to carry out its functions. In some instances this is the
more prudent method for the State to conduct its schools, since it often
results in substantial savings to the taxpayer. If the State may rent
buildings, then it may rent them from any individual, group, or asso-
ciation that has such buildings available. It may therefore rent school
buildings from religious societies as legally as it may rent them from
an agency that is in the rental business for profit. The purpose of the
constitutional provision is not to exclude religious organizations from
legitimate business dealings with the State, but, rather, only to prevent
the State from giving a financial or other preference to one religion over
another, and to prevent the compulsory attendance of a person at
religious exercises or religious instruction which offend his own beliefs.
THE LAW:
In general the law is that church-owned property may be used as a
public school, just so long as there is in such arrangement no support
of sectarian education by state funds.31 The primary consideration of
the courts in cases where the issue arises is to determine if the tenets
of a particular religion are being taught in a public school. Apparently
it has been too long settled that the name of the landlord is immaterial
for the courts any longer to concern themselves with the issue.
Within the framework of such a rental transaction between a Church
and the State are often other factors which might or might not tend to
make the transaction illegal. Where the board of education or the
school district simply turns over the education of the district to the
hands of a religious school, the arrangement is, inter alia, an unconsti-
tutional surrender of authority. If the school is to be a public school,
as it purports to be, the management of it must remain in the hands of
the school board. State moneys will be withheld from a school where
this situation arises.3 2
Often also the sectarian teachers who formerly operated the school
31 Dorner et al. v. School District No. 5 in the Town of Luxemburg, 137 Wis.
147, 118 N.W. 353, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 171 (1908) ; Crain et al. v. Walker et al.,
222 Ky. 828, 2 S.W. 2d 654 (1928).
s2 Williams et al. v. Board of Trustees of Stanton Common School District, 173
Ky. 708, 191 S.W. 507 (1917).
[Vol. 36
RELIGION, EDUCATION AND LAW
as a religious school are retained as teachers of the public school. In
some instances, as where the school was formerly conducted by a
religious order of the Catholic Church, the teachers wear a distinctive
garb. The charge has been made that this subjects children of other
faiths to subtle influences contrary to their own faith. We will deal with
this particular issue separately in Topic IX, infra, page 54.
Where sectarian instruction is given as part of the school curriculum,
the arrangement is patently unconstitutional. Inasmuch as the laws of
all of the states require school attendance, if a child is compelled to
attend a public school where the tenets of a particular faith are promul-
gated, he is plainly deprived of his constitutional rights.3 3 However,
the prohibition against sectarian instruction cannot be extended to
cover teachings which are merely expositions or explanations of general
principles of morality.
The use of church property for public school purposes has recently
been brought into question in Wisconsin. The Protestant Bill of Rights
Committee, an organization formed by and composed of the members of
the Lutheran Men in America of Wisconsin, asked Wisconsin officials
in the latter part of February of this year to cut off all tax support to
fourteen Wisconsin public schools, on the ground that these schools are
"under the domination of the Roman Catholic Church." On March 14th
the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, Mr. George E. "Watson,
granted the demand on the grounds that the schools selected teachers on
the basis of a religious test, that they included sectarian instruction in
their curriculum, and that they failed to operate a complete school of
eight grades.
Most of the schools concerned in the controversy are located in rural
areas where the population is almost entirely Catholic. According to
Mr. Watson, these fourteen schools were scheduled to receive a total of
$25,000 in tax money out of a total budget for public education of
$17,000,000. If the schools are infringing on the religious liberty of any
person, or if public aid is going to the support of the Catholic Church
in preference to other groups, the Lutheran Committee is right in de-
manding that tax money be withheld from these schools. If, however,
the schools are operated simply as public schools, the Committee is
wrong in its demand and the State Superintendent is wrong in acceding
to it. A statement of the facts in one such case is enlightening.
According to Mr. William R. Bechtel-in an article appearing in
The Milwaukee Journal on February 19, 1952, the Lima school, Pepin
County, leases the first floor of a school building belonging to the
Church of the Holy Rosary. This circumstance standing alone, as we
3 State ex rel. Weiss et al. v. District Board of School District No. 8 of the
City of Edgerton, 76 Wis. 177, 44 N.W. 967 (1890).
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have seen, violates no constitutional provision. On the contrary, it is
specifically provided for by statute in Wisconsin.- The second floor of
the building is occupied by a Catholic high school, conducted as a private
sectarian school. Church auhtorities maintain that no religious in-
struction is given in the Lima school. Mr. Watson ruled that such in-
struction has been given. There is, therefore, a direct conflict on this
issue. We do not have the evidence before us, and we are consequently
unable to ascertain the truth of the matter. It would be our opinion that
the State Superintendent was mistaken in his assertions. We find it
difficult not to accept the word of men dedicated to the doctrine that
there is a moral law established by Almighty God, and that, under this
law, a falsehood to one who has a right to know the truth is intrinsically
sinful. Nor can we assume that these men are mistaken in their state-
ments, since they are on the spot to observe and to know the facts.
Further, to our certain knowledge, Catholics never attempt to subject
others to their doctrines when these others do not want to hear them.
This policy is followed consistently in Catholic schools throughout the
country. The non-Catholic enrollment in Catholic schools and colleges
varies from one or two per cent to as much as thirty-five per cent or
more. Even though it is the privilege of these schools to require attend-
ance at classes of Catholic doctrine or at Catholic religious exercises,
this is never done. Protestant schools can boast of no such scupulous
regard for constitutional rights. On these grounds, even though they
do not have the dignity of evidence, we are inclined to doubt the
correctness of Mr. Watson's ruling.
It is a further fact in the Lima school situation that the principal
and most of the teachers are nuns. All of them have been properly
trained and legally hired. In a later section15 we shall discuss the
wearing of religious garb by teachers in public schools. Suffice it to say
here that, although there have been adverse decisions in other juris-
dictions, we do not believe the wearing of a particular style of dress is
unconstitutional. The Wisconsin Statutes specifically prohibit discrim-
ination on the basis of religious affiliation in the hiring of teachers.
36
This would seem to have some bearing on the right of teachers to exer-
cise their constitutional freedom to follow the disciplinary rules of their
3 "The annual common school district meeting shall have power: * * * (5) To
vote a tax to purchase or lease suitable sites for school buildings * * *." Wis.
STAT. (1949), § 40.04 (Italics added). The annual high school district meeting
has the same power in relation to high schools under Wis. STAT. (1949),
§40.41(2).
Cf. Topic IX, infra, p. 54.
36 "No discrimination shall be practiced in the employment of teachers in public
schools because of their race, nationality or political or religious affiliations,
and no -questions of any nature or form shall be asked applicants for teach-
mg positions in the public schools relative to their race, nationality or political
or religious affiliations, either by public school officials or employees or by
teachers' agencies and placement bureaus." Wis. STAT. (1949), § 40.775.
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faith, which rules require the wearing of distinctive apparel. The
Lutheran Committee also charged that the display of statuary and
pictures indicated an adherence to the Catholic Faith. That this should
make any difference seems ridiculous-a grasping for any excuse, no
matter how feeble, to accomplish an end-but it is of little moment, the
offending pictures may easily be removed. The discouraging part of this
whole charge is that representations of God and those who devoted their
lives to Him could be offensive to persons who profess a belief in that
same God.
The group, however, made a far more serious charge. It alleged that
in some of the fourteen school districts, the school board has relin-
quished its duties and placed them in the hands of Church officials. This
is clearly an unconstitutional delegation of power if the allegation be
true. It would afford a basis of a mandamus action to compel the board
to perform its duties. The Williams case 37 is authority for the propo-
sition that public funds should be withheld from such schools as are
operating under this arrangement. But if the allegation be untrue, there
is no issue. It is significant that Mr. Watson made no such finding when
he announced his reasons for discontinuing state aid to these public
schools.
There is at present a case on the Lima school situation pending in
the Eau Claire county circuit court. A Protestant parent refused to send
his children to the Lima school, and he has been charged with causing
truancy. As a result of this case the Wisconsin Supreme Court may be
called upon in the future to rule specifically on the issues herein pre-
sented. Also, the schools involved may seek to mandamus Mr. Watson
to get the aid which he has summarily cut off.-
VI
THE ISSUE:
Is the use of public school property for religious purposes a violation
of the Federal or state constitutions?
FOR THE AFFIRMATIVE:
Public schools are erected by tax moneys for the purpose of giving
non-sectarian education to the children of the state. In allowing the use
of these schools by religious groups, it is within the realm of possibility
3 Williams v. Board of Trustees, supra, note 32.
38 Mr. Watson's ruling also raises this interesting legal question: In view of
his determination that these schools are not public institutions, can the local
school boards continue to levy taxes to support them? Presumably an action to
enjoin this taxation would have to come from a local taxpayer. But most of
these areas are nearly 100% Catholic, and the Catholics will hardly be inter-
ested in bringing such an action. Nor can it be assumed that the few non-
Catholics in these areas will want to seek such an injunction. Undoubtedly
the Milwaukee Lutheran Committee will invade these school districts in
search of someone who is willing to sue. It has already pledged its financial
support to the Lima farmer of whom we have spoken.
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that the state educational program might in some degree be prejudiced.
The State has the duty to protect its plan of education from even the
merest chance of jeopardy. Therefore, the State must prohibit the use
of school property for religious purposes.
The maintenance of the school is a public charge. In using the
school property religious groups contribute to the wear of the building,
burn electric lights, and require additional heat. In this way such groups
are receiving the benefit of tax moneys, and this is no more than a
compulsory contribution to that religion by every taxpayer not a member
of the Church so benefited. This is expressly prohibited by the Federal
and state constitutions.
"The argument is a short one. Taxation is invoked to raise
funds to erect the building; but taxation is illegitimate to provide
for any private purpose. Taxation will not lie to raise funds to
build a place for a religious society, a political society, or a social
club. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.
As you may not levy taxes to build a church, no more may you
levy taxes to build a school-house and then lease it for a church.
Nor is it an answer to say that its use for school purposes is not
interfered with, and that the use for other purposes works little,
perhaps no immediately perceptible, injury to the building, and
results in the receipt of immediate pecuniary benefit."3 9
FOR THE NEGATIVE:
While it is true that the State must protect the education of its
minor citizens from interference, the State is not obliged to reduce its
protection to an absurdity by prohibiting that which can in no way affect
education. To seek to deprive citizens of the right to use the school-
house for religious purposes, during periods when it is not being used
for school purposes, on the ground that this might in some unseen way
interfere with the educational process, is as senseless as depriving citi-
zens of the right to walk across the school yard, when not being used
by the school, on the ground that this interferes with the education of
children. Reductio ad absurdum! Further, the cost to the taxpayer in
such use is so negligible as to come within the rule of de ininimis.
Affirmatively it may be argued that the State, within proper and
reasonable bounds, should allow the use of its schools for religious meet-
ings, since it thereby aids and encourages a better moral spirit in the
community. Such a spirit is the core of the common welfare, and,
admittedly, the common welfare is the primary concern of the State.
There is no question of the preferential treatment that is prohibited by
constitutional provisions where the use of the schools is available to all
sects indiscriminately.
39 Spencer v. Joint School-District No. 6, 15 Kan. 202 (*259), 204 (*262), 22
Am. Rep. 268 (1875).
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THE LAW:
Presumably there is no state that recognizes a right of citizens to
use publicly owned schoolhouses for any purpose other than education.
Therefore, when such use is permitted, it is a privilege granted by
statute. Some states40 have never granted the privilege. In Spencer v.
Joint School District4 ' the Kansas court said that no right exists unless
granted by the legislature. Where the legislature has failed to act, out-
side use is prohibited.
Other states have statutes which permit denominational groups to
use public schools outside of school hours. A leading case upholding the
constitutionality of these statutes is Nichols -v. School Directors.42 The
Illinois court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sheldon, said:
"In what manner, from the holding of religious meetings in
the school house, complainant is going to be compelled to aid
in furnishing a house of worship and for holding religious
meetings, as he complains in his bill, he does not show. We can
only imagine that possibly, at some future time, he might as a
tax-payer be made to contribute to the expense of repairs ren-
dered necessary from wear and use of the building in the holding
of religious meetings. A single holding of a religious meeting in
the school house might, in that way, cause damage in some degree
to the building, upon the idea that continual dropping wears away
stone, but the injury would be inappreciable. As respects any in-
dividual pecuniary expense which might in this way be involved,
we think that consideration may be properly disposed of under
the maxim de ininimis, etc.
"Religion and religious worship are not so placed under the
ban of the constitution that they may not be allowed to become
the recipient of any incidental benefit whatsoever from the public
bodies or authorities of the State."4
3
It is well recognized, however, that, under these statutes, those
authorities who have the power to permit sectarian religious services in
the school building also have the converse right to deny such use.
44
The question as to how far such permission, when granted, may extend
has been the subject of litigation in the courts. The general rule would
seem to be that the proper authorities may permit the use of the schools
for religious purposes as long as such use is reasonable and proper. If
the use is so frequent as to turn the school into a place of worship, the
40For example, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Kansas. Wis. STAT. (1949),
§ 40.16 (5)-(9) allows the use of school buildings only for nonsectarian
civic purposes.
4"1 Supra, note 39.
42 93 Ill. 61, 34 Am. Rep. 160 (1879).
43Ibid., at pp. 63-64. In Townsend v. Hagan et. al., 35 Iowa 194 (1872), the
court said: "That it [the use of a public school building for religious meet-
ings] is proper, ought not to be questioned in a christian State [sic.]."
44 Eckhardt et al. v. Darby et al., 118 Mich. 199, 76 N.W. 761 (1898); 47 AMb.
JUP SCHOOLS § 213.
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use will be prohibited.45 If the use in any way interferes with the use
of the building as a school, it will be prohibited. Some courts, in order
to protect the proper functioning of the school, have interpreted their
statutes to mean that religious groups could use the school only during
the summer vacation period. Indiana so interpreted the phrase in its
statute,16 "unoccupied for common school purposes. '47 Where the use
is restricted to the summer, no heat and very little electricity is used by
the church groups.
The Supreme Court for New York County held that the use of
public schools by sectarian groups was advantageous rather than harm-
ful where the gatherings were not religious in nature, but, rather, were
for the purpose of giving and receiving instruction in education, learn-
ing, and the arts. The court held that an inquiry into a group's religious
affiliation would violate the group's right to the free exercise of its
faith. The groups involved were the Newman Club (Catholic), the
Young Men's Christian Association, and other organizations, whose
primary purpose in the particular meetings was not worship. The court
did not say that worship would be permissible, but then it was not called
upon to pass on this question.48
VII
THE ISSUE:
Is the reading of the Bible, the saying of prayers, or the singing of
hymns in the public schools violative of the Federal or state con-
stitutions ?
FOR THE AFFIRMATIVE:
The reading of the Bible, the saying of prayers, and the singing of
hymns, taken together or individually, constitutes sectarian instruction
and transforms public property into a place of worship contrary to
constitutional provisions. Moreover, it compels the taxpayer to support
such a place of worship. Where the attendance is compulsory at such
exercises, it results in state promotion of sectarian principles contrary
to the faith of some of its hearers, and where it is not compulsory, the
practice marks off those who choose not to attend in such a way as to
result in mental coercion.
FOR THE NEGATIVE:
The Bible is not a sectarian book, nor are prayers or hymns neces-
sarily sectarian. Therefore, neither the reading of the Bible, the saying
45 State ex rel. Gilbert et al. v. Dilley et al., 95 Neb. 527, 145 N.W. 999, 50
L.R.A. (N.S.) 1182 (1914).
46 BURNS ANN. S1'AT. (1901), § 5999.
47 Baggerly et al. v. Lee, 35 Ind. App. 177, 73 N.E. 921 (1905).
48 Lewis v. Board of Education of City of New York, 157 Misc. 520, 285 N.Y.S.
164 (1935) [modified in other respects in 247 App. Div. 106, 286 N.Y.S. 174(1936); rehear:ng denied 247 App. Div. 873, 288 N.Y.S. 751 (1936); appeal
dismissed 276 N.Y. 490, 12 N.E. 2d 172 (1937).
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of prayers, nor the singing of hymns in the public school classrooms
constitutes sectarian instruction. Since they are not sectarian, it is im-
material whether attendance at these exercises is optional or compulsory.
Nor can these practices standing alone turn the school building into a
place of worship.
It must be conceded that it is the duty of the State to promote and
protect the moral welfare of the citizenry. This being so, there can be
no more appropriate way of fulfilling this obligation as regards children
than to read to them books which are promotive of moral principles.
The Bible is pre-eminently fitted for this office.
THE LAW:
At the present time the Bible is read in the schools of thirty-five
states, either by option or by requirement. In discussing this issue the
courts have had to determine two questions: first, is the Bible a sectarian
book? and, second, is compulsory attendance at the reading of the Bible
a violation of the right to freedom of conscience? We shall for the most
part confine this discussion to Bible reading in state conducted schools,
since the rules applicable to this are equally applicable to prayers and
hymns, and since Bible reading has been the paramount question
before the courts.
A majority of the courts hold that the Bible is not a sectarian book.
A much quoted case in support of this view is Hackett v. Brooksville
Graded School District.49 The Kentucky court was of the opinion that
the reading of the Bible, without note or comment, is not sectarian
instruction. In order to be sectarian a book must teach the peculiar
dogmas of a sect, as such, and not merely be so comprehensive as to
include them by the partial interpretation of its adherents. A book not
otherwise sectarian does not become sectarian merely because it is edited
or compiled by persons committed to any particular religious belief.
Arguing from this premise the court reasoned that the reading of the
Bible could in no way render the school a place of worship. This being
true, no person could have any cause for complaint because of the
instruction in the Bible, any more than there could be cause for com-
plaint because geography was being taught in the school system. It
must be remdmbered that the State is free to prescribe any course of
study for the children within its jurisdiction that it deems necessary to
good citizenship, safeguarding, however, constitutional guarantees of
freedom of conscience. 50
Wisconsin, on the other hand, has taken judicial notice of the fact
4D 120 Ky. 608, 87 S.W. 792, 69 L.R.A. 592, 117 Am. St. Rep. 599, 9 Ann. Cas. 36(1905).
50 Mfeyer v. Nebraska, supra, note 1.
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that the Bible is a sectarian book. 51 In line with the Wisconsin view are
the courts of Illinois,52 Nebraska,5 3 Washington,54 and Louisiana.55
Ohio has upheld a school board directive which prohibited the hitherto
followed practice of reading the Bible in the public schools of that
state.58 The decision in the Ohio case, however, was placed upon the
grounds that, since the Constitution of Ohio did not require religious
instruction, the court had no authority to decide for a board of education
what the law gave to the board to decide, viz., what instruction should
be given in the schools.
On the basis of its decision that the Bible is a sectarian book, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in Weiss v. Board of Education57 held that
the reading of the Bible violated two sections of the State Constitution-
that prohibiting the giving of sectarian instruction in district schools,58
-and that prohibiting the payment of treasury money to religious semi-
naries.59 However, the court conceded that there was much in the Bible
that could not be characterized as sectarian, and admitted that such
portions could be read to public school pupils without complaint.
Further, the prohibition did not include textbooks founded upon the
fundamental teachings of the Bible, even though they might contain
extracts from it.
Although there is a conflict in the courts as to whether the Bible
is or is not sectarian, there is no such conflict among the theologians and
exegetes, no matter what their faith may be. The King James version
of the Bible differs radically from the Douay (Catholic) version in
certain portions. The Jewish Scriptures differ in one glaring particular
from both the Catholic and Protestant versions-in the total absence
of the entire New Testament. Nor are all Protestant versions in com-
plete harmony. A Protestant translation of a few years back, for ex-
ample, brought into question the validity of the ending to the Lord's
Prayer which has always formed a part of the King James version.
Recently the Jehovah Witnesses completed their own edition of the
Bible. The differences in the Bible are not, therefore, only differences
in interpretation, as was suggested in the Hackett case."0 We are con-
strained to agree with the experts in their field, with the theologians,
51 Weiss et al. v. District Board, supra, note 33. The doctrine enunciated in this
case has most recently been approved in Milwaukee County v. Carter, 258 Wis.
139, 45 N.W. 2d 90 (1950).
52 People ex rel. Ring et al. v. Board of Education of District 24, 245 Ill. 334,
92 N.E. 251 (1910).
53 State ex rel. Freeman v. Scheve et al., 65 Neb. 853, 91 N.W. 846 (1902).
- State ex rel. Deare et al. v. Frazier et al., 102 Wash. 369, 173 Pac. 35 (1918).
55 Herold et al. v. Parish Board of School Directors et al., 136 La. 1034, 68 So.
116 (1915).
56 Board of Education v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211 (1872).
5 Weiss v. District Board, supra, note 33.
58 Supra, note 5.
5 9 Supra, note 4.8 0 Hackett v. Brooksville Graded School District, supra, note 49.
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rather than with the view of the majority of our state courts. Wisconsin
and its followers are undoubtedly correct in holding the Bible to be a
sectarian book. And while we can agree with Wisconsin that there are
some portions of the Bible which are not sectarian, because they are but
moral principles common to all men, yet we cannot agree that, on this
basis alone, such portions may be read in the public school system. Our
disagreement stems from the fact that neither the teachers, the school
board, nor the courts, are competent to pick out these portions. Despite
all of this, however, we feel that Wisconsin is wrong in absolutely pro-
hibiting the reading of the Scriptures in public schools. This brings us
to the second point.
In those states in which the Bible is or may be read in the public
schools there is generally the provision that compulsory attendance may
not be required. In a leading case on the subject the Constitution of
Georgia provided:
"All men have the natural and inalienable right to worship
God each according to the dictates of his own conscience, and no
human authority should in any case control or interfere with such
right of conscience."' 51
The City Commissioners of Rome, Georgia, passed an ordinance
which required the daily reading of the King James version of the Bible
during the regular sessions of the school, permission for withdrawal
being granted at the written request of a child's parents. The Supreme
Court of Georgia held that this ordinance did not offend the constitu-
tional provision above quoted.62 And in Michigan it was held that
compulsory attendance at a public school did not constitute compulsory
attendance at a place of worship merely because the Ten Command-
ments were taught therein. 3
A more recent case on this same subject was decided in New Jersey
in 1950. A statute in that state required the reading of five verses of
the Bible each school day. In Doremus v. Board of Education .of
Borough of Hawthorne4 this statute was challenged as violative of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution. The
New Jersey Superior Court and the Court of Errors and Appeals up-
held the constitutionality of the statute. Since attendance was not com-
pulsory, the 'court could see no compulsory sectarian education, and
since the Bible was not regarded by the court as sectarian, the court
could see no sectarian education at all. On March 3rd of this year, the
Supreme Court of the United States dismissed an appeal of the case on
61 GA. Co NsT. ART. I, § 1, 12, Civil Code (1910),§ 6368.
62Wilkerson et al. v. City of Rome et al., 152 Ga. 762, 110 S.E. 895 (1922).
63 Pfeiffer v. Board of Education of City of Detroit, 118 Mich. 560, 77 N.W.
(1898)..
-47 N.J. Super. 442, 71 A.2d 732 (1950), aff'd 5 N.J. 435, 75 A. 2d 880 (1950),
noted 34 MARQ L. REv. 297 (1951).
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the ground that there was no justiciable controversy. It seems that one
of the petitioners had failed to exercise his privilege to have his child
excused from the Bible classes and the statute no longer affected
another of the petitioners because his child had passed from those grades
to which the statute applied. The Court therefore refused to consider
the merits of the case.65
Colorado,6 6 Minnesota, 7 and Iowa 6s have also held with the New
Jersey view. In the Colorado case the court stated that if the State
compels students to attend the reading of the King James version of the
Bible, against the will of the parents, it is thereby usurping the con-
stitutional right of the parents to direct the education of their children.
The Colorado view seems to be the correct one. For if the Bible is
sectarian, as we maintain, then compulsory attendance at its reading
is compulsory sectarian education, and this is plainly unconstitutional
under both Federal and state constitutions. But this problem is not met
with if attendance is at the will and option of the parents. No student's
religious rights are being violated, and no doctrine not approved by his
parents is being taught to him. But this raises another problem.
The proponents of Bible instruction are torn upon the horns of a
dilemma. If they wish their children to receive Biblical instruction,
they must hold the Bible to be non-sectarian, for, if it is sectarian, the
instruction violates constitutional provisions (as worded in some states)
that no such instruction shall ever be given. These constitutional pro-
hibitions are absolute, and make no exception for those instances where
the instruction is optional. But, if they hold the Bible to be non-
sectarian, which exegesis, theology, and reason plainly show it is not,
then logically they must uphold the right of a school board to prescribe
the reading of the King James version of the Bible to Catholics and
Jews. This is manifestly a violation of freedom of conscience. The
proper solution to the problem seems to be that, for the good of the
community in order that the Bible may be read, the Bible should be
held non-sectarian. Such a holding, even though contrary to reason,
permits the reading of the Bible in the school system without a violation
of that section of the constitution which prohibits sectarian instruction.
With that obstacle hurdled, there remains only the problem of preventing
compulsory attendance. This may be done by a holding that compulsory
attendance is barred, not by the fact that the Bible is sectarian, but by
the fact that parents have the constitutional right to direct the education
of their children. It seems important to us that Bible reading be con-
65 Doremus et al. v. Board of Education of Borough of Hawthorne et al., 72
Sup. Ct. Rep. 394 (1952).G6 People ex rel. Vollmar v. Stanley, supra, note 11.
6 Kaplan v. Independent School District of Virginia et al., 171 Minn. 142, 214
N.W. 18 (1927).0s Moore v. Monroe, 64 Iowa 367, 20 N.W. 475 (1884).
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tinued in the schools, so long as pupils are not forced to listen to
translations which offend their own religious beliefs. One look at the
ethical disintegration of our government and the crumbling moral
structure of the country as a whole should be sufficient to make even
the most militant atheist come screaming in defense of such a program.
There remains but one objection to the optional Bible reading pro-
gram-the "embarrassment" of children not attending the classes. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court put it this way:
"When, as in this case, a small minority of the pupils in the
public school is excluded, for any cause, from a stated school
exercise, particularly when such cause is apparent hostility to the
Bible, which a majority of the pupils have been taught to revere,
from that moment the excluded pupil loses caste with his fellows,
and is liable to be regarded with aversion, and subjected to
reproach and insult."' 9
This argument was also presented in the McCollum case," the
petitioner invoking a statement in the Ring case,-' decided in the same
jurisdiction, in support of her contention. The state court7 2 dismissed
the argument on the ground that that statement had been made in a case
concerning Bible reading, which was not in controversy in the case
before it. The Supreme Court of the United States held that it was not
necessary to consider the effect of the released time program on the child
in view of its decision on other points.733 We mention this case here only
because we feel that the answer of the school board is at least a partial
answer to the objection. The attorneys for the Board of Education
argued that, if the child suffered any embarrassment, it resulted from
his anti-religious attitude, not from any deficiency in the plan. Th"t
is to say, the fault for the embarrassment lay wholly with the child (or,
more accurately, with his parents), and not from the practice itself. In
effect what these attorneys were arguing was that a whole checkerboard
should not be destroyed merely because one checker is blue instead of
red or black. If it were the board that were ill-made there would be an
argument for its destruction, but not otherwise. This argument was
presented in a controversy over released time, but it is equally as valid
when applied to Bible reading classes. But it is only a partial answer.
It seems to us that a more complete reply to the charge is that the
69 Weiss v. Board of Education, stpra, note 33.
70 McCollum v. Board of Education, supra, note 7.
71 Supra, note 52. The court said in that case, at p. 351, that, "The exclusion of
a pupil from this part of the school exercises in which the rest of the schooljoins, separates him from his fellows, puts him in a class by himself, de-
prives him of his equality with the other pupils, subjects him to a religious
stigma and places him at a disadvantage in the school, which the law never
contemplated."
72 People ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education of School District No. 71,
396 Ill. 14, 71 N.E. 2d 161 (1947).
73 McCollum v. Board of Education, supra, note 7.
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State has no duty to protect a child from embarrassment, reproach, o
insult. Children are by nature brutally frank, even cruel. They tease
each other mercilessly, they form aversions, they fight. If the State is
going to undertake to protect the child at one point, there seems to be no
logical reason for its stopping there-it should protect the child from
such mental and emotional abuse in all circumstances. But this is totally
impossible. Neither an army of officials nor the entire state treasury can
accomplish this. Children must grow solving the problem of their
relationships one with the other as best they can. They seem for the
most part to be able to do this quite well. There is no occasion for state
interference.
The foregoing arguments assume the truth of the contention that
children not participating in the program are subjected to embarrass-
ment, reproach, or other abuse. However, basing its observation on
human experience, the court in the Stanley case7 4 dismissed the objection
by remarking:
"It is urged that to absent themselves for a religious reason
'subjects the pupils to a religious stigma and places them at a
disadvantage.' We cannot agree to that. The shoe is on the
other foot. We have known many boys to be ridiculed for
complying with religious regulations but never one for neglecting
them or absenting himself from them."
Anyone who knows kids will agree that this is the perfect answer
to the objection.
VIII
THE ISSUE:
Is it a violation of state constitutions or statutes or of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States for
public schools to release students from school to attend religious classes
of their own denomination and choosing?
FOR THE AFFIRMATIVE:
All states have compulsory education laws. If students are released
by their teachers, their principals, *or by the school board from classes
during times ordinarily set aside for school work, the compulsory edu-
cation statutes are being violated. Admittedly, if a state has a statute
which permits released time, the compulsory education laws are not
violated, but in these states the compulsory education laws are helping to
provide pupils for religious classes. This amounts to a state aid to
religion and this is unconstitutional.
The use of school facilities, such as school rooms, telephones, office
space, stenographic services, and the like, constitutes an unlawful ex-
penditure of state funds to aid religion.- The printing of report cards
and attendance cards, as well as the payment of teachers' salaries for
74Vollmar v. Stanley, supra, note 11, at p. 617.
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the time which they use in entering data on these cards, is likewise an
unlawful expenditure of state funds. It is not necessary to the validity
of this argument that all or even some of these expenditures be made,
it is sufficient if there is only one such expenditure.
Released time is an unconstitutional union of Church and State.
In order that it function properly certain services must be rendered to
the religion classes by the school board, the principal, or the teachers.
Since they act as public officials, their services constitute state aid to
religion. This aid may easily be construed as amounting to the establish-
ment of religion. Where school premises are used, the union of Church
and -State is even more obvious.-
Released time constitutes an infringement of the constitutional
rights of those students not participating in the program, in that, by
their failure to attend religion classes, they incur the scorn, xeproach,
and insults of their fellow students, and are unnecessarily embarrassed
thereby. The right of freedom of conscience dictates that non-partici-
pating pupils be free of such embarrassment.
FOR THE NEGATIVE:
The power of school authorities to release students from classes for
various reasons has never been questioned in the United States. It lies
within the discretion of these authorities to determine what constitutes
a valid excuse for such absences. The compulsory education laws com-
prehend this power, at least by implication, and, therefore, released time
for religion classes is not a violation of these laws.
It is a non sequitur to assert that, because the education laws compel
attendance at school, they are thus providing pupils for classes which
are entirely voluntary. Classes which are optional do not become
obligatory merely because attendance at them follows compulsory
attendance at other classes. Nor can it be said that the school is recruit-
ing for various sects, since, under released time plans, the program is
only announced to parents who must themselves take positive action by
requesting (usually by written note) that their child be released to
attend a designated religious class.
There can be no argument with the assertion that the use of public
school classrooms, the printing of attendance and report cards, the use
of teachers' time, and the rest, all constitute a disbursal of state funds,
nor can it be argued that such disbursal does not aid religion. But this
goes upon the premise that state aid to religion, per se, is wrong. Under
the wording of the Federal Constitution and the several state constitu-
tions this premise is highly questionable. But even if it were wrongful,
the amount involved is so infinitesimal as to come within the maxim
that "the law does not take notice of trifles." And even if the sums so
expended should be considered appreciable, still it constitutes no
1952]
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obstacle to released time since these services are not essential to the plan.
For the same reason it is no valid argument to claim that the rendition
of these services or the granting of academic credit for the religion
classes is an unlawful union of Church and State. The plan doesn't
need them.
However, where such services (or at least some of them) are not
granted, the plan is no longer termed released time, but, rather, dis-
missed time. There is much authority for the proposition that dismissed
time is constitutional since it results only in shortening one school day
to allow the pupils to go wherever they please. School authorities have
always had this power. But under this plan teachers may give their
time to check attendance or to perform other services without complaint.
For, in such case, they are acting as private individuals and not as state
officials. Teachers, as well as anybody else, may donate their time after
working hours to whatever project they choose. To deny them this
is to deny them due process. Therefore, the use of teachers' time does
not constitute an expenditure of public funds on religion.
The various answers to the argument that Bible reading in the
school results in embarrassment to the child who does not attend the
exercise is equally applicable to the same argument when used with
reference to released time or dismissed time programs. 75 There is also
in this situation an additional factor mitigating the argument of em-
barrassment to the child. Whereas in the Bible reading situation the
pupils not participating are set apart from the majority who stay to-
gether, in released time classes the students are divided into three or
four groups. This eliminates the possibility of any conspicuous
segregation.
Moreover, every person of religious belief or moral intentions must
agree with the statement of Mr. Justice Sheldon:
"Religion or religious worship are not so placed under the
ban of the constitution that they may not be allowed to become
the recipient of any incidental benefit whatsoever from the public
bodies or authorities of the State ;,,76
or with the statement of Mr. Justice Cardozo, equally applicable to
released time, in his concurring opinion in the Hamilton case:
"I cannot find in the respondents' ordinance an obstruction by
the state to 'the free exercise' of religion as the phrase was
understood by the founders of the nation, and by the generations
that have followed." 77
THE LAW:
The cases on released time are few.. An early case was decided in
I5 Infra, p.
76 Nichols v. School Directors, supra, note 42, at p. 64.
77 Hamilton v. Regents, su pra, note 1, at p. 265.
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New York in 1925.78 The Supreme Court held the plan to be illegal on
two grounds: first, because public funds were illegally spent in having
record cards for the classes in religion printed; and second, because the
release of forty-five minutes of school time was a violation of the
compulsory education laws. No appeal was taken from this decision.
However, two years later a similar case was brought to the New York
courts. A different division of the Supreme Court tried this case, and
its decision favored the released time program.79 The court pointed out
that in this case there was no question of tax money being illegally spent,
since all cards used were printed at private expense. The court did not
feel called upon either to approve or disapprove the Stein case80 since
that case was not up before it for review. This case was appealed to
the New York Court of Appeals, and the judgment of the Appellate
Division, affirming the judgment of the Supreme Court, was affirmed.8 '
In his opinion Judge Pound said:
"A child otherwise regular in attendance may be excused for
a portion of the entire time during which the schools are in
session, to the extent at least of half an hour in each week,
to take outside instruction in music or dancing without violating
the provisions of the Compulsory Education Law, either in letter
or spirit .... Practical administration of the public schools calls
for some elasticity in this regard and vests some discretion in the
school authorities. Neither the Constitution nor the law dis-
criminates against religion. Denominational religion is merely
put in its proper place outside of public aid or support.
' '8 2
New York has again been called upon to adjudicate the question of
released time. The program was held to be constitutional in view of
the fact that no public funds are spent in support of it.83 As this article
goes to press the Supreme Court of the United States has handed down
its decision affirming, six-to-three, the New York decision.
Within the past six years the Supreme Court of Illinois has twice
had occasion to pass on the question of released time.8 4 In neither case
could the court find a violation of constitutional guarantees. In Latimer
v. Board of Education85 the issuance of a writ of mandamus was asked
to compel the Board of Education of Chicago to revoke a regulation of
18 Stein v. Brown et al., 125 Misc. 692, 211 N.Y.S. 822 (1925).
79 People ex rel. Lewis v. Graves, 127 Misc. 135, 215 N.Y.S. 632 (1926), aff'd.
219 App. Div. 233, 219 N.Y.S. 189 (1927).
80 Stein v. Brown, supra, note 78.
81 People ex rel. Lewis v. Graves, 245 N.Y. 195, 156 N.E. 663 (1927).
82 Ibid., at p. 664.83 Zorach v. CIauson. 198 Misc. 631, 99 N.Y.S. 2d 339 (1950), aff'd 278 App.
Div. 573, 102 N.Y.S. 2d 27 (1951), aff'd 303 N.Y. 616, 100 N.E. 2d 463 (1951),
noted 35 MARQ. L. REv. 385 (1952).
84People ex rel. Latimer et al. v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago,
394 Ill. 228, 68 N.E. 2d 305, 167 A.L.R. 1467 (1946); McCollum v. Board of
Education, supra, note 72.Q5 Latimer v. Board of Education, supra, note 84.
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sixteen years-standing permitting released time. The petitioner alleged
this regulation constituted an establishment of religion and the diversion
of public funds to a sectarian purpose. Mr. Justice Fulton, in delivering
the opinion of the court, said:
"We concede that the board of education should not help
sustain or support any school controlled by a church or sectarian
denomination or aid any church or sectarian ,purpose. On the
other hand, we do not deem it the duty of a school board to be
hostile or antagonistic to religion or churches, nor should it
interfere with the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
freedom.
"The preamble to the constitution, adopted in Illinois in 1870,
recognizes the reliance of the people upon a deity, and while the
decisions of the Federal and State courts approve the doctrine
of the separation of church and state, it is nowhere stated that
there is any conflict between religion and the State, nor any
disfavor of any kind upon religion as such.... In [Reichwald v.
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 258 Ill. 44, 101 N.E. 266, Ann. Cas.
1914B, 301 (1913)], it was held, 'The Constitution does not
absolutely prohibit the exercise of religion, but, on the contrary,
provides that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious pro-
fession and worship, without discrimination, shall be forever
guaranteed. . . . The man of no religion has a right to act in
accordance with his lack of religion, but no right to insist that
others shall have no religion.' "86
The court could find no merit in the petitioner's arguments.
Similar disposition was made of the McCollum case,8T the court
finding no unlawful expenditure of tax funds. The fact that public
school classrooms were used was deemed immaterial, since they would
have been used during the period anyway if there had been no released
time. The court followed its earlier decisions and the decisions in New
York that religion is not completely barred from even incidental aid.
This case was destined to have a more famous, or infamous, end than
previous cases on the subject. After the Illinois Supreme Court had
handed down its decision, the Supreme Court of the United States
decided the historic Everson case.s The four dissenting Justices in that
case held that the First Amendment forbade any aid by the State to
religious exercises, including released time. The statement was entirely
gratuitous, since only the transportation of parochial school children on
state-owned buses was before the Court. This decision determined Mrs.
Vashti McCollum to appeal her case. The Supreme Court of the United
States reversed the Supreme Court of Illinois,89 and held the released
88 Ibid., at p. 308.
87 McCollum v. Board of Education, supra, note 72.88 Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing et al., 330 U.S.
1, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711, 168 A.L.R. 1392 (1947).
s9McCollum v. Board of Education, supra, note 7.
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time program unconstitutional on two counts: tax supported property
was used for religion classes; and the compulsory education laws of the
state helped to provide pupils for these classes. The Court ignored the
constitutional right of other parents to direct the character of their
children's education and to be free from state interference with the free
exercise of religion, even though certain Protestant parents intervened
in the action to assert those rights. Counsel for the Board of Education
unearthed previously unpublished documents to show the legislative
intent of the Congress upon the passage of the First Amendment. The
Court, however, arbitrarily brushed aside the Congressional intent with
no more than an observation that it was unable to accept the appellee's
contentions in this regard. Mrs. Vashti McCollum was so elated by her
victory that she moved to write a book concerning it. From the state-
ments in this book it is obvious that she had no interest in protecting the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion in bringing her suit.
Mrs. McCollum is the daughter of one of the leaders of that chronic
disease, the Freethinkers Society. It is clear from her book that she
was interested only in the advancement of atheism, and to this end she
sought and found a legal weapon to club religion. Happily for Mrs.
McCollum she found a court, the Supreme Court of the United States,
that was willing to overlook the rights of all those who didn't agree with
her.
The McCollum decision brought the nation's highest court into
disrepute. The legal profession as a whole indicated its disapproval of
the case. No one wishes to deny to Mrs. McCollum her right to practice
atheism. No one is advocating the abrogation of the freedoms protected
by the First Amendment. But we do not believe that anyone should be
allowed to accomplish this very same result with respect to the adherents
of religion under the guise of being the protector of the First Amend-
ment. In effect the McCollum decision denied the free exercise of
religion to the vast majority of Americans. We expect our courts to
see through such attempts as these. It should be pointed out that, despite
its broad language, the McCollum case did not outlaw released time
programs per se. It was restricted to its own fact situation. The Zorach
case,90 just decided by the Supreme Court, contains none of the so-called
objectionable features of the McCollum case. This decision has done
much to clarify the question of just how far the Supreme Court is
prepared to go in hindering the advancement of religion. There is a
point, Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Jackson dissenting, beyond which
even it is not prepared to step.
In the 1948 statement of the Catholic Bishops of the United States
it was said concerning the McCollum decision:
90 Zorach v. Clauson, U.S. Sup. Ct., April 28, 1952.
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"The opinion of the court advances no reason for disregard-
ing the mind of the legislature. But that reason is discernible
in a concurring opinion adhered to by four of the nine judges.
There we see clearly the determining influence of secularist
theories of public education-and possibly of law. One cannot
help remarking that, if this secularist influence is to prevail in
our government and its institutions, such a result should in
candor and logic and law be achieved by legislation adopted after
full popular discussion, and not by the judicial procedure of an
ideological interpretation of our Constitution."
It seems like a reasonable request!
Ix
THE ISSUE:
Does the wearing of religious garb by teachers in public schools
offend against the constitutional provisions prohibiting sectarian in-
struction or the control of the schools by any sectarian group?
FOR THE AFFIRMATIVE:
There can be little doubt but that effect of a religious costume, when
worn at all times by teachers in the school in the presence of their pupils,
is to inspire respect, if not sympathy, for the religious denomination to
which these teachers so manifestly belong. To this extent the influence
is sectarian, even if it does not amount to the teaching of denominational
doctrine.
Over and above this, the hiring of such teachers places the control
of public education into the hands of those who are committed to one
religious doctrine. In addition, the payment of salaries to these teachers
violates constitutional provisions prohibiting the payment of public
money to support religious groups or sectarian schools.
FOR THE NEGATIVE:
The effect of a religious garment is merely to direct attention to a
person's religious beliefs. Sectarian adherence is not a secret matter.
Even if no distinctive garb is worn, a teacher's religious affiliation is
generally known, both to the community and to her pupils. The respect
inspired by every teacher is respect for the teacher herself, and only
incidentally for that teacher's religion. Whatever respect might be
shown for the teacher's religion will arise whether religious dress is
worn or not.
Inasmuch as every person must have some religious belief, whether
it be Catholicism, Protestantism, Judaism, agnosticism, or out and out
atheism, the employment of any person as a teacher must necessarily
throw the control of public education into the hands of teachers pro-
fessing adherence to one or another religious belief. The fact that some
teachers wear mufti and others do not is of no consequence. To control
means to dominate or direct; it does not mean mere employment, or even
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numerical superiority. For if it did no school could constitutionally
operate unless every sect were represented by the same number of
teachers in each school as every other sect. This is manifestly ridiculous.
There are in this country 264 sects plus varying degrees of agnosticism
and atheism.
Discrimination in the hiring of teachers is prohibited at least im-
plicitly by most state constitutions. These prohibitions are usually
buttressed by more specific provisions in the statutes of each state.
Furthermore, such discrimination amounts to state interference with
the free exercise of religion in violation of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Federal Constitution, since it penalizes adherence to
any sect so discriminated against. In refusing to hire or in prohibiting
the hiring of teachers, otherwise qualified, because their dress reflects
their doctrinal persuasion, the State is unconstitutionally discriminating
against a person because of his religious affiliation.
THE LAW:
The decisions on this particular issue are in conflict. Some of the
decisions hold that the wearing of religious garb is unconstitutional.
New York early held this way on the ground that the respect and
sympathy engendered for the teacher's religion by reason of the dis-
tinctive dress was sectarian teaching.91 The fact that this was not in any
respect doctrinal instruction was considered immaterial. Within the
last few months the Supreme Court of New Mexico has also banned
the wearing of religious garb. 92 Although the only question which the
New Mexican court had to decide was the validity of a resolution of the
State Board of Education prohibiting such garb, the court went on to say
that the wearing of a religious habit in the public schools would be
unconstitutional whether the State Board resolution existed or not.
Other states uphold the constitutionality of hiring teachers who wear
a religious dress, but also uphold the validity of a statute or regulation
by the school authorities prohibiting their employment. In 1894, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court reiterated the right of .nuns to be em-
ployed in the public schools of that state. The court said:
"But it is further argued that, if the appointment of these
Catholic teachers was lawful, they ought to be enjoined from
appearing, in the school room in the habit of their order. It may
be conceded that the dress and crucifix impart at once knowledge
to the pupils of the religious belief and society membership of
the wearer. But is this, in any reasonable sense of the word,
'sectarian' teaching, which the law prohibits? The religious
belief of many teachers, all over the comronwealth, is indicated
by their apparel. Quakers or Friends, Omnish, Dunkards, and
91 O'Connor v. Hendrick et al., 184 N.Y. 421, 77 N.E. 612, 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 402,
6 Ann. Cas. 43? (1906).
92 Zellers et al. v. Huff et al., 55 N.M. 501, 236 P.2d 949 (1951).
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other sects, wear garments which at once disclose their member-
ship in a religious sect. Ministers or preachers of many Protes-
tant denominations wear a distinctively clerical garb. No one
has yet thought of excluding them as teachers from the school
room on the ground that the peculiarity of their dress would teach
to pupils the distinctive doctrines of the sect to which they
belonged. The dress is but the announcement of a fact,-that
the wearer holds a particular religious belief. The religious belief
of teachers and all others is generally well known to the neighbor-
hood and to pupils, even if not made noticeable in the dress, for
that belief is not secret, but is publicly professed. Are the courts
to decide that the cut of a man's coat or the color of a
woman's gown is sectarian teaching, because they indicate sec-
tarian religious belief?""g
In the following year, however, the Pennsylvania legislature passed
an act which prohibited teachers from wearing any apparel which in-
dicated religious affiliation. This act was adjudged valid, since it was
not directed at the beliefs of the teachers, but only at their actions.94 As
recently as 1936 North Dakota held that the employment of nuns, mem-
bers of a religious order of the Roman Catholic Church, who were
otherwise duly qualified as teachers under the state law, was not un-
constitutional as contributing tax money to support a sectarian school or
as placing the public schools under sectarian control. 95 As in Pennsyl-
vania, however, North Dakota has passed a statute forbidding religious
dress in the public schools. New York upheld a prohibitory regulation
issued by the State Superintendent of Public Instruction.9" At the pres-
ent time there are ten states, including Wisconsin, which permit re-
ligious dress in their public school systems.
Both the Hysong97 and the Gerhardt" cases came to the conclusion
that it is not a proper subject for the courts to inquire what disposition
teachers make of their salaries. The fact that nuns contribute a portion,
or even all, of their wages to the order to which they belong does not
constitute state aid to religion, since secular teachers could do the same
with their salaries if they so wished. The State has no further interest
in the money after it has been paid out in wages.
9a Hysong et al. v. Gallitzin School District et al., 164 Pa. 692, 30 Atl. 482, 484,
26 L.R.A. 203, 211, 44 Am. St. Rep. 632, 635 (1894).
Commonwealth v. Herr et al., 229 Pa. 132, 78 Atl. 68, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 422(1910).
9 Gerhardt et al. v. Held et al., 66 N.D. 444, 267 N.W. 127 (1936).
Ps O'Connor v. Hendrick, supra, note 91.
Hysong v. Gallitzin SchoolDistrict, supra, note 93. The court said, at p. 484(of 30 AtI.), that, "It is none of our business, nor that of these appellants,
to inquire into this matter. American men and women, of sound, mind and
twenty-one years of age, can make such disposition of their surplus earnings
as suits their own notions."
9 Gerhardt v. Heid, supra, note 95.
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X
THE ISSUE:
Does the granting by the State of free transportation and free text-
books to children attending parochial schools come within constitutional
prohibitions against state aid to sectarian education?
FOR THE AFFIRMATIVE:
The State constitutional provisions prohibit the disbursal of public
funds to sectarian groups. This means that any tax money which is
authorized for educational purposes must be distributed only to public
schools. If the State authorizes either free school bus transportation or
free textbooks for pupils in sectarian schools, it is distributing state
money, at least indirectly, to these schools. What may not be done di-
rectly may not be done indirectly.
FOR THE NEGATIVE:
In making education compulsory, the State has declared its public
policy to be the promotion of education. But the education to which the
State has thus committed itself is not restricted to public education,
since the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the inherent right
of parents to choose their children's school. The State is, therefore, in-
terested in the promotion of any education not dangerous to itself or to
the child. While constitutional provisions prohibit the expenditure of
State funds on secrtarian groups, they do not prohibit the expenditure
of such funds on individual children merely because they receive their
education from a denominational school. To the contrary, this would
amount to an unconstitutional discrimination in the apportionment of
public money because of religious belief.
In giving free transportation and free textbooks to parochial school
children, the State is aiding the child to acquire an education. The child,
and not the school, is the recipient of this aid. If there is any accidental
or incidental benefit to the parochial school, this is of no consequence to
the State. It is not the purpose of the Constitution to force such schools
out of business.
THE LAW:
There seems to be agreement on the proposition that a state consti-
tutional provision permitting state aid to parochial school children does
not offend the Federal Constitution. But where the state constitution
makes no stipulation for this, the decisions are in conflict as to whether
statutes offend the state constitution. In 1938 the New York Court of
Appeals nullified by a four-to-three decision a statute permitting a school
board to furnish public transportation to pupils attending religious
schools. 99 A vigorous dissent by Chief Judge Crane argued that the
statute was designed to assist children and not schools, and that this was
99 Judd v. Board of Education, 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E. 2d 576 (1938).
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no more unconstitutional than approving attendance at these schools.
After this case was decided New York amended its constitution to per-
mit such transportation.' 00 Wisconsin is in line with the New York case.
In State ex tel. Van Straten v. Milquet 0 ' the court refused to accept
the argument that such aid was extended only to pupils and not to
schools. The question was again presented to the Wisconsin Supreme
Court a few years ago in Costigan v. Hall.10 2 The court, however,
avoided the question of whether a district school board could lawfully
expend money for the transportation of children to a parochial school.
The court held that since, in the case before it, the children were not
attending the nearest district school, as provided by statute,103 they were
not entitled, therefore, to public transportation. It was the opinion of
the Attorney General that this decision meant that, regardless of any
constitutional question, transportation to parochial schools is illegal in
Wisconsin in the absence of statutes expressly permitting it.10 4
Maryland, on the other hand, approved a statute similar to that of
New York in the same year that New York knocked its statute out.1' 0
The Maryland court felt that there was nothing unconstitutional in the
State acting to help pupils comply with its compulsory education law.
To the same effect was the decision of the New Jersey Court of Errors
and Appeals in Everson v. Board of Education of Township of
Ewing.06 The New Jersey statute allowed reinmbursement to parents
of bus fares paid by children attending non-profit private schools. The
complainant, one Arch Everson, was a taxpayer and a resident of Ewing
Township, New Jersey. He contended that the statute aided the Catho-
lic Church, and was, therefore, a law respecting the "establishment of
religion," prohibited by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Upon
receiving an adverse decision in New Jersey, complainant appealed to
the Supreme Court of the United States.10 7 The judgment was affirmed
in a five-to-four decision, Mr. Justice Black correctly reasoning that the
First Amendment does not cut members of religious bodies from serv-
ices that are indisputably separate from the religious function. The
State was deemed to be extending a legitimate health and welfare serv-
ice. The opinion added,
"That [the First] Amendment requires the state to be a neu-
100 N.Y. CONST. ART. XI, § 4.
101 180 Wis. 109, 192 N.W. 392 (1923).
102249 Wis. 94, 23 N.W. 2d 495 (1946).
103 "The school boards of all school districts operating public elementary schools
or public high schools of any type shall provide transportation to and from
school, for all pupils residing in the district and over two miles from the
nearest public school they may attend." Wis. STAT. (1949), § 40.34(1).
0 38 O.A.G. 582 (1949).
105 Board of Education of Baltimore County v. Wheat, 174 Md. 314, 199 Atd.
628 (1938).
106 133 N.J.L. 350, 44 A.2d 333 (1945).
107 Everson v. Board of Education, supra, note 88.
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tral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-
believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State
power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions, than it is
to favor them."'108
Despite this favorable decision on the question of free transporta-
tion, the decision dealt Church-State relations a severe set-back. Mr.
Justice Black held that government cannot, under the Constitution, aid
religion in any manner, whether discrimination be present or not. His
now famous statement was that,
"The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amend-
ment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Govern-
ment can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another."'10 9
This was a novel interpretation of the First Amendment, and it pro-
vided the basis for the McCollum decision previously discussed. It re-
mains to be seen how the Zorach decision of April 28th, in which Justice
Black dissented, will ameliorate the harm done to religion by the Ever-
son case.
On the question of free textbooks, the decisions follow those on free
transportation very closely. The Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court refused to countenance the use of public funds to pro-
vide books to children not attending public schools. It held that since
the children did not use these books for any purpose distinct from the
school purpose, the books were to the benefit of the school."1 Louisiana
reached a diametrically opposite conclusion a few years later in two dif-
ferent cases, on the ground that only the children and the State were
benefitted.1" The case of Cochran v. State Board of Education was
appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States where it was af-
firmed, the Court proceding on the ground that, since the state court
had concluded that the aid was to the children alone, it could not be said
that the taxing power of the state was not being used for a public pur-
pose."
2
LEGAL AND MORAL CONSIDERATIONS
Since the most serious blows to religious education in recent years
have come, not from interpretations of state constitutions, but from the
interpretation placed on the First Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States in recent years, an examination of that Amendment would
not be amiss. It provides that,
108 Ibid., at p. 18.
109 Ibid., at p .15.
10 Smith v. Donahue et al., 202 App. Div. 656, 195 N.Y.S. 715 (1922).
M11 Borden et al. v. Louisiana State Board of Education et al., 168 La. 1005,
123 So. 655 (1929); Cochran et al. v. Louisiana State Board of Education
et al., 168 La. 1030, 123 So. 664 (1929).
112 Cochran et al. v. Louisiana State Board of Education et al., 281 U.S. 370,
50 S.Ct. 335, 74 L.Ed. 913 (1930).
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"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ; . .. ."
What precisely does this mean? Religion is nothing more nor less
than that virtue by which men exhibit due worship and reverence to
God.'1 3 Externally the term denotes a system of beliefs or practices in
the worship of God which is common to a particular group of men.
Thus, when we speak of a "religion," we most commonly speak of an
organized or semi-organized society, formed for the worship of God,
professing similar doctrines, and going under a distinctive name, e.g.,
the Roman Catholic Church. There is no reason for suspecting that
Congress referred to anything more in its use of the term than this. The
history of the world prior to the enactment of the Constitution, the
background of its framers, the legislative annals, and contemporary
collateral material all point to such an intent. Congress, then, did not
want the establishment of a religious society, an organized group pro-
fessing one belief, to the exclusion of all others. But what is meant by
the term "establishment"? Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines the
infinitive "to establish" as to make a national or state institution of a
church, that is, -to set up a certain church group which is supported by
the civil authority. Practically all of the colonists had come in contact
with state-supported churches, either in Europe or in the American
colonies, where taxes were levied for the established church. It was the
determination of the authors of the Constitution that this situation
should not arise in the new nation. They did not, however, feel obliged
to prohibit the individual states from erecting state churches. As a mat-
ter of fact, the last established church was not abolished until 1833
when Massachusetts disestablished the Congregational Church. We say,
then, that the First Amendment merely prohibits Congress from setting
up a religion which it can compel men to practice or to support against
their consciences.24
The Supreme Court has interpreted this in the past to mean that
Congress should make no law to aid religion. But this hardly seems
justified, as the majority opinion in the recent Zorach case seems to
realize.11 The words do not say it, the framers of the Amendment did
"13 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS SUMMA THEOLOc.ICA, II-II, lxxxi, I.
14 "Without assuming to express an opinion of the real scope of the prohibitory
words, we suggest that it seems to be the opinion of learned commentatorg
of very high authority, that the declaration was intended to secure nothing
more than complete religious liberty to all persons, and the absolute separa-
tion of the church from the state, by the prohibition of any preference by
law, in favor of any one reliqious persuasion or mode of worship." Roberts
v. Bradfield, 12 D.C. App. 453 (1898), aff'd Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S.
291, 20 S.Ct. 121, 44 L.Ed. 168 (1898). (Italics added).
115 Neither official nor unofficial reports of the Supreme Court decision are as
yet available as this article goes to press. However, Justice Douglas, writing
the majority opinion, was quoted in the Chicago Tribune, April 29, 1952, as
follows: "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a supreme
being. When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with
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not mean it,116 and the conditions of the times certainly do not require
it. On the contrary, the poor moral showing of our civilization seems
to require just the opposite. In the matter of education, as in every
other facet of life in which the State has an interest, the primary con-
cern of the State is good citizenship and the peace and welfare of the
community. This concern is most eminently aided by the moral teach-
ings of religion. This was most learnedly said during the Renaissance
period by His Eminence, Silvio Cardinal Antoniano.
"The more closely the temporal power of a nation aligns it-
self with the spiritual, and the more it fosters and promotes the
latter, by so much the more it contributes to the conservation of
the commonwealth. For it is the aim of the ecclesiastical au-
thority by the use of spiritual means, to form good Christians in
accordance with its own particular end and object; and in doing
this it helps at the same time to form good citizens, and prepares
them to meet their obligations as members of a civil society.
* * * How grave therefore is the error of those who separate
things so closely united, and who think that they can produce
good citizens by ways and methods other than those which make
for the formation of good Christians. For, let human prudence
say what it likes and reason as it pleases, it is impossible to pro-
duce true temporal peace and tranquility by things repugnant
or opposed to the peace and happiness of eternity.' 1 7
How, then, do the opponents of government aid to religion justify
their position? They do it by taking as their guide Jefferson's famous
statement that the First Amendment erected a "wall of separation be-
tween curch and state." In view of his Bill for Amending the Consti-
tution of the College of William and Mary and his many other declara-
tion, there is much doubt whether Jefferson meant by his statement
such an extreme separation as that consistently being urged on the
American people by Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Jackson. But let
us concede that he did. Let us concede that Jefferson meant that the
State was to be so separated from the Church that it must harm the
Church, if that is necessary, in order to avoid aiding it. Even if Jeffer-
son did mean all of this, that still does not make his statement a rule of
law. The First Amendment does not contain the phrase. It is a mere
figure of speech. It does not seem necessary to point out that figures of
speech do not constitute law. If they did, we would be in a sorry con-
religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian
need, it follows the best of our traditions.
"To hold that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a require-
ment that the government show a callous indifference to religious groups.
That would be preferring those who believe in no religion over those who
do believe. * * * We find no constitutional requirement which makes it
necessary for government to be hostile to religion."
116 For example, see Madison's views in the ANNALS OF CONGRESS, I, cc. 758-759
(Washington, Gales and Seaton, 1834).
127 Silvio Antoniano, Dell'educaz, crist., lib. I, c. 43, as quoted by Pope Pius XI,
Encyclical, Christian Education of Youth, 1929.
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dition indeed. The interpretation of the law is at best a subjective thing
anyway. But if we allow loose phrases not contained in the law to color
our legal thinking, we are subjecting the body politic to the caprices,
whims, and fancies of the judiciary. This is not healthful, and has
never been so considered by the legal profession. To the contrary, the
courts have endeavored to make as exact a science as possible of the
interpretation and application of the law. Why, then, have we made
so many exceptions in the case of the First Amendment? Simply be-
cause of the ascendancy of secularism in our society. The proponents
of the secularist concept want the State without the Church, man with-
out God. They cannot have this if the First Amendment is to be inter-
preted in the traditional manner. But they have discovered that by
supplanting this Amendment with an isolated phrase uttered by one of
the Republic's most revered leaders they can reduce religion to an in-
ferior position in the country. This is their aim, and, until the Zorach
case was decided on April 28th of this year, they had been succeeding
admirably. Unfortunately there is no cause as yet to suspect that their
success is at at end. One case neither makes nor ends a trend.
By the phrase "separation of Church and State" we may mean any
one of four things. We may mean that the Church and its priests, min-
isters, and rabbis must never express an opinion on any political or
ethical question which has become the subject of political controversy.
This position has never been accepted in the United States, as witness
the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment, the Protestant political
partisanship in the Smith-Hoover presidential campaign of 1928, or the
exhortations of the Catholic clergy to the faithful to vote against a pro-
posed law to permit euthanasia. Or we may mean by this phrase that
the Church has no rights except those given to it by the State. This of
course is subjugation, not separation, and is not held at all in this coun-
try. The more prevalent interpretation is, as we have seen, that ex-
pressed by Mr. Justice Black in the Everson case 18 when he said that a
governor cannot "aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one re-
ligion over another." A more rational but less fashionable meaning of
the phrase is to the effect that the State may not establish any particular
Church or sect as a state church, nor may it give preferential treatment
to one Church or a few Churches to the exclusion of all others. We sub-
mit herein that this latter interpretation is the correct one, and we reject
on three grounds the previous holdings of the Supreme Court: on the
clear wording of the First Amendment, on the intent of the Congress
when the First Amendment was proposed to it for passage, and on an
ethical consideration of the province and duty of the State.
We believe that the wording of the Amendment is clear-it needs
118 Everson v. Board of Education, supra, note 88.
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only to be read. The many learned works on the legislative history of
the First Amendment makes any reiteration here totally superfluous.11 9
The appellate brief of the Board of Education in the McCollum case
20
presented a very able presentation of the historical argument. The Su-
preme Court in that case dismissed these arguments, but in our opinion
this does not destroy their validity.
Apart from the First Amendment, does the State have any duty in
reference to religion? We believe that it does. We have presented the
argument several times throughout this paper, but we will detail it more
completely here.
Man is by nature a social creature. Being a social creature he is
moved to live in the society of his fellow man. But nature and experi-
ence show us that society is impossible without authority. Anarchism
will not work, simply because man is often moved by avariciousness and
desire to take his neighbor's possessions, sometimes his life, if not re-
strained. Such restraint must of necessity come from society itself,
acting for its own protection and the common welfare. In order to ac-
complish this effectively, the authority of each member of society to
govern himself must be given up into the hands of a single person (e.g.,
a king) or a group of persons representing specified individuals (as in a
republic). This person or group of persons thereafter has the power
to enact laws and to enforce them by the application of penal and other
sanctions. This is the State.
The State, therefore, has the power of the government of men. But
it has this power only for the protection of the individuals who com-
prise it and for the promotion of the common good. Hence any "law"
which does not operate to one of these ends is no law at all, since it is
excess of the authority of the State. Therefore, the primary concern of
the State is the welfare of the community.
We can say, then, that the State is concerned with all things which
advance the common good. Taking as our major premise, which we
assume without further proof, the existence of God, we must necessarily
acknowledge man's duty to pay reverence to Him. Because of the nature
and perfection of God and the nature and dependence of man, the wor-
ship of God must constitute man's primary duty. This duty is common
to all men. Therefore, whatever facilitates the worship of God pro-
motes the common duty. But what is the common duty but the common
good? It seems to us that the inescapable conclusion from this chain of
argument is that the State must promote the worship of God as the su-
119 Two recent works by Professor James 11. O'Neill, Religion and Education
under the Constitution (1949) and Catholicism and American Freedom
(1952), are recommended to those interested in pursuing this subject. See,
also, Edward J. Corwin, A Constitution of Powers in a Secular State (1951).
120 McCollum v. Board of Education, supra, note 7.
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preme expression of the common welfare. As we have said elsewhere,
the worship of God is what we call religion. Ergo, it is not only the
right of the State, but its positive duty, to aid religion.
If the State fails in this duty, not only is it committing the grievous
sin of failing to render unto God the things that are God's but it is also
harming itself in a material sense. Where religious ideals are missing
the community loses in many ways. Take for example the losses to the
armed forces occasioned by promiscuous sexual relations with diseased
women. Consider the vast expenditure of tax money on prisons, salaries
of law enforcement officials, and criminal and juvenile courts. And
above all reflect on all of the money which annually disappears into the
coffers of corrupt public officers. These are not scare thoughts, they
are actualities attested to by every edition of the nation's daily news-
papers. Immorality costs the government money. And immorality is
the direct result of the failure of society to place the proper emphasis
on religious teachings. The good pagan is a total failure. If there is no
God a man is a fool not to take by force and stealth all that he can. What
else can society expect as a consequence of failing to inculcate religious
teachings in its youth. And what else is society but the State?
In no sense does state aid to religion offend the provisions of the
First Amendment. Rather we can say that a denial of such aid is the
only unconstitutional action. The second phrase in the First Amend-
ment's provision relating to religion states that Congress shall make no
law "prohibiting the free exercise thereof." This can mean no more nor
less than that every person shall be free to exercise his religious convic-
tions, except, of course, that any beliefs which are inimical to the wel-
fare of the State may not be practiced. If the State forbids any parent
from imparting religious education to his children, it is obviously act-
ing unconstitutionally. It is also acting unconstitutionally if it makes
religious instruction more difficult for the parent. Now such things as
released time, Bible reading in public schools, tax exempt sectarian
schools, and the like, manifestly render the task of giving religious in-
struction less difficult. If the members of a political subdivision wish to
allow these things, and do allow them through legal process, the State is
interfering with constitutional rights if it enjoins such acts. The State
is no more than the people who comprise it. Thus, the people may,
within the legal bounds of the Constitution which they have enacted
for their own protection and government, authorize those things which
they deem most beneficial to them. The teaching of religion to the na-
tion's young is beneficial. Many groups have recognized this, and have,
through various means, sought to encourage this instruction. Of course,
in allowing, prescribing, or encouraging religious education, a majority
of the people may not deny to a minority the same constitutional rights
under which the majority is acting. But where the religious liberty of
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the minority is safeguarded, the First Amendment guarantees the rights
of the people to practice their religion freely. Now the mere fact that
they do this through the use of the public school system makes no dif-
ference, as long as the schools are not converted into places of worship,
and as long as children are not taught a creed contrary to that professed
by their parents. The public schools are, after all, erected for the benefit
of the public. They are built primarily for education, but, if this is not
interfered with, there is no reasonable objection for using them for
other purposes as well. But whether uses other than education are or
are not objectionable is of little consequence here, since religious in-
struction is not only itself education, but is education of the very highest
type.
Our conclusion from the foregoing arguments is that fhe State is
bidden on moral grounds to aid the religious education of children, and
is forbidden on constitutional grounds from interfering with it.
CONCLUSION
The law is not something to twist and turn and stretch, to distort
and dismember and distrust. The law is a reasonable thing, that is,
something to which the reason can assent. We therefore hold that, on
the basis of -reason and the law, every person has a right to practice his
religion freely, so long as it is not dangerous to the State, and, even if
it is dangerous, he has at least the right to privately believe in his re-
ligion. We hold that the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Con-
stitution of the United States prohibit either the state or federal govern-
ments from setting up a state-supported Church or from levying taxes
for the support of any particular Church. We hold further that the
State may not give any preference to any one Church or group of
Churches to the exclusion of others. We hold that the enforced indoc-
trination of children with a creed not authorized by their parents is un-
lawful, and that neither the State nor any of its political subdivisions
may convert a public school into a place of worship.
But this we do maintain, on both moral and legal grounds: that the
State has not only the right, but the affirmative obligation, to aid re-
ligion; that it is incumbent on the State to impart moral instruction to
children, or, at the very least, to permit others to do so through the pub-
lic school system. Our position is based on the proposition that the State
must do all that advances the common good, and that the workshop of
God is the highest expression of the common good. On the same reason-
ing we maintain that the State has the duty to permit and to encourage
the erection of parochial schools. We maintain further that the parents,
or those whom they have desiguatetd, have the sole right to direct the
education of their children. The right of the State in this regard stops
with the imposition on the parents of the obligation to educate, the pre-
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scription of certain courses conducive to good citizenship, and the pro-
hibition of the teaching of those things inimical to the public welfare.
We posit that a denial of religious education does irreparable harm
to the State and to the Church which the State has the duty to protect.
If the prevailing trend continues, if the Zorach case is but an exception
to the general rule, if the Constitution continue to be interpreted in the
light of the unwritten secularist amendments, the inevitable result will
be the loss of the Judeo-Christian concept of morality. The country can
no more stand such a loss than it can stand the loss of its armed forces.
Many citizens are trying to prevent such a loss. It behooves us all, in
and out of government, to. aid them.
